A Comparative and Critical Analysis of the Electronic Legal Personality of Artificial Intelligence and Its Impact on Human Liability

Abstract

The growing autonomy of artificial intelligence (AI) systems challenges traditional concepts of legal personhood, civil liability, and attribution of harm. This study examines whether granting electronic personhood to AI can resolve liability problems or instead weaken human accountability. It employs a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative legal approach, examining the European Union, Iran, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The findings show that proponents regard electronic personhood as a potential means of protecting victims, whereas opponents argue that it may obscure human responsibility, create difficulties concerning identity and accountability, and fail to ensure compensation due to AI’s lack of independent assets. The comparative analysis indicates that the European Union’s 2024 Artificial Intelligence Act did not establish electronic personhood as an independent legal status, instead emphasizing human oversight and accountability. The study concludes that, under current legal and technological conditions, electronic personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve AI-related liability. Rather, it may create or widen a liability gap by allowing human actors to evade responsibility. A more appropriate framework would preserve human accountability and allocate liability according to each actor’s role, degree of control, and capacity to prevent foreseeable risks.